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Abstract:  
Purpose – Financial Transactions Fraud (FTF) and Financial Statements Fraud (FSF) grew 
exponentially during the last decades coupled with complex and sophisticated technological 
developments. This study investigates the practitioners’ interpretation of fraud with recurring 
audit issues in the Disclaimer Audit Opinions (DAOs) reports within the Solomon Islands Public 
Sector (SIPS).  
Design/methodology/approach - The empirical study involves qualitative data analysis. The 
analysis alongside theoretical developments is informed by the “fraud triangle” theory. Findings 
– The research results revealed the practitioners’ acknowledgement of financial 
statement Fraud, Financial Transaction Fraud and fraud in the SIPS, as generally prevalent and 
aligned to some components of the fraud triangle theory. This study is sceptic about the 
good intentions of the International Public-Sector Accounting Standards –Cash-basis 
(IPSAS) framework and favours the Provincial Government Act 1997 and the 
Public Finance Management Act 2013 (PFMA) requirements. It further suggests that fraud is 
positively linked to repeated audited report issues and the executive management when 
DAOs issues appear repeatedly in annual audit reports.  
Originality – This study contributes to the literature on fraud and attempts to link 
the interpretation of fraud with recurring audit issues in the Disclaimer Audit Opinions 
(DAOs) reports in the Solomon Islands Public Sector (SIPS). It views fraud awareness and 
knowledge from the perspective of the audit practitioner. There is an increasing need to 
understand how fraud knowledge impacts decision making and the actions of auditors and 
others, an area that is underdeveloped. 
Paper type: Research paper 
Key words: Solomon Islands, Auditing, Fraud, Financial Statement Fraud, Disclaimer 
Audit Opinions, Public Sector  
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The literature on fraud has evolved over time from the pioneering publication of “White collar 
crime” by Sutherland in 1937 (Lokanan, 2015), and “Other peoples’ money (Fraud Triangle)” 
(Cressey, 1953) to more recent studies (see Pickett and Pickett, 2002; Gottschalk, 2010; Free, 
2015; Albrecht et al. 2015). Financial related frauds impact the growth of corporations, public 
sector developmental activities and programmes (Albrecht et al. 2015). It exists in many forms, 
such as cyber-enabled frauds to Financial Statements and Financial Transaction fraud. Global 
business losses, attributed to financial fraud, were estimated from USD2.9 trillion (Dorminey et 
al., 2010) to USD3.5 trillion in 2014 (Free, 2015). According to Albrecht et al. (2015) financial 
statement fraud is mainly a top-down form of fraud that impacts negatively on individuals, 
organizations, and society. This remains so if there are weaknesses that can be exploited for gain, 
and where companies and other organizations, as well as private individuals, will be taken 
advantage of (Pickett and Pickett, 2002). In a small economy, like the Solomon Islands, fraud is 
a huge concern. For example, the Office of the Auditor-General of the Solomon Islands (OAGSI) 
chooses ‘missing documents’ in place of financial fraud on SBD60 million unaccounted funds, 
which was only  10% of an audit sampling (Cohen, 2014).  
 
 
This paper investigates whether fraud is linked with Solomon Island Public Sector frequent issue 
of DAOs. This was done using interviews with practitioners (auditors and accountants) to better 
understand their interpretation of fraud with recurring audit issues in the Disclaimer Audit 
Opinions (DAOs) reports within the SIPS. This study makes a valid contribution to the academic 
literature because of the understanding of how a technical concept (such as ‘fraud’) is being 
interpreted, and applied by practitioners, is still under-developed. Similarly, at the 
methodological level, this paper makes an important contribution by engaging with practitioners 
and shedding light on the operation of audit practice, something which much of the prior 
research has avoided. This paper also provides evidence on the operationalization of audit 
standards, regulation and good practices in the public sector, which is seldom studied and from a 
unique jurisdictional setting. According to Henning (2009), fraud can be defined as an 
intentional perversion of the truth for inducing another person, in reliance upon it, to part with 
some valuable thing belonging to him, or to surrender a legal right. Therefore, for fraud to occur 
there must be an act of dishonesty, a gain to the committer and a loss to the victim, which can be 
a system, an individual etc. (Ohalehi, 2018). Throughout this paper, the term “practitioners” was 
used interchangeably as participants, professionals, experts or interviewees. The examined frauds 
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1.1 Research Background 
 
The small nation, known as the Solomon Islands, was a former British Protectorate since 1890s 
until it was accorded its political autonomy in 1978 (CIA, 2007). Transparency International 
(2016) ranked the Solomon Islands 72 out of 176 in its annual corruption perception index.  The 
index implied that among the 176 ranked countries, the Solomon Islands ranks as corrupt, 
because a lesser ranking indicates the less likely it is that a country is corrupt.  On the public 
sector corruption indicator, the country is ranked 42 out of 100 where  100 is very clean 
(Transparency International, 2016).  Again, in both ‘perception’ rankings, the country had 
positioned itself in the midpoint scores generally. Furthermore, an in-country study in 2016 also 
revealed the SIPS as very corrupt; with a lack of morale, planning, leadership, law enforcement 
and accountability. The SIPS is funded by an annual budget as legislated under respective 
appropriation Acts of Parliament. It is governed by the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
2013 and implemented by a second-tier government of nine provinces with the intention to fund 
services and community development initiatives to 80% of the rural population.  
 
 
Despite these legislative expectations, the actual benefits of the provincial grants  have not 
filtered into the rural populace (Suluia, 2012; MDPAC, 2016). The disbursed grants to the SIPS 
are managed by the respective Provincial Governments (PG), or government ministries, and 
there are requirements that they are to be accounted and audited annually, as required by the 
Office of the Auditor-General of the Solomon Islands. Historically, SIPS have never had their 
annual financial statements submitted, and/or prepared for auditing, for the period from 1993 to 
2008. The same applies to the national accounts (RAMSI, 2013). However, since 2003, the 
OAGSI received external expertise and resources to commence the annual auditing of the SIPS 
accounts to date (RAMSI, 2013; Cohen, 2014).  Between 2008 and 2014 the auditing of these 
accounts illustrated a pattern of audit issues that have  repeatedly recurred over this same period, 
and have attracted the FSs to be issued with DAOs under the international auditing practice 
(Sawaneh and Puri, 2014).  
 
 
Against this backdrop, this study aims to examine whether the underlying fraud is linked to the 
repeated audited reports’ adverse findings of the SIPS. We investigate the SIPS professional 
practitioners around their fraud experiences and expose what they confront with the FS 
preparation and audit, and how those experiences relate to a pattern of the continuous issue of 
DAOs in the audited FSs of the SIPS. We carried out this investigation using a case-study to 
provide an in-depth analysis of practitioners’ views and their perception on FTF and FSF, in 
general, within the SIPS context. Based on this background, this study focuses on the outcome of 
the SIPS audited reports and how those reports have been impacted by the DAOs, accounting 
framework, disclosure and their possibility of financial fraud commitment. 
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The context of the SIPS is confined to the national government and the nine provincial 
governments that produced financial statements for statutory audit on an annual basis. The 
others, more than twenty government ministries, have not been producing any financial 
statements on an annual basis (Clark and Levy, 2012a) despite being headed up by government 
ministers and ministerial financial controllers. This trend supports the SIPS definition, as the 








2. Related literature on Financial Statement and Transaction Fraud 
 
 
During the past decades, a substantial amount of academic studies has been carried out on fraud 
in general and financial statement fraud (FSF) in particular (Hogan et al. 2008; Zhou and 
Kapoor, 2011; Woolley, 2016). However, these studies have looked at the causes, detection, 
determinants and consequences of FSF, as well as how FSF can be remedied, particularly, its 
increasing adverse impact on the global economies. This has made FSF a study of interest for 
regulators, policy makers and researchers.  
 
 
The US Generally Acceptable Accounting Practice (GAAP) defines FSF as “any undisclosed 
intentional or grossly negligent violation of GAAP” (Hopwood et al., 2012, p.11) while Rezaee 
(2005, p.279) refers to it as a “deliberate attempt by corporations to deceive or mislead users of 
published financial statements, especially investors and creditors, by preparing and disseminating 
materially misstated financial statements.”  This can be related to when financial statements are 
furnished with untrue financial information (Zhou and Kapoor, 2011).  Alternatively, FSF 
schemes can be done in the form of improper revenue recognition, account misappropriations, 
under or over statements and ‘other miscellaneous’ techniques (Hopwood et al., (2012). They 
further extend it to the fraudulent financial transaction (FT) processing when an account balance 
is intentionally processed or modified. There are also factors, such as the fact that an audit firm’s 
reputation may affect the quality of conducted audits leading to fraudulent financial information 
(Hogan et al., 2008).  In such a case as this fraudulent information, such as the lack of accounting 
supporting schedules in an accounting system general ledger, which is used to support financial 
statements, can also be considered as fraudulent transactions. Repeatedly, corporate scandals and 
collapses results from FSF. The 2008 global financial crisis partially resulted from the US’ 
Lehman Brothers USD50 Billion FSF (Lokanan, 2015). Similarly, Japan’s largest corporate 
scandal, by Toshiba in 2015 was a result of the USD1.2 billion FSF (Rahman and Marc, 2016), 
and Enron’s impaired USD63.4 billion assets resulted from numerous FSF (Benston and 
Hartgraves, 2002). Interestingly, these FSF trends have not been in decline since the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Rather, they seem to have increased by about 140% 
according to the 3,000 corporate officers surveyed by Hogan et al. (2008).  
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Similarly, the SIPS financial accounting reporting disclosure intends to convey to voters, 
taxpayers, donors and other interested parties around the status of financial management and 
performance. FSF is possible even if the SIPS have mandated processes, and they neglect the 
conventional financial reporting framework, leading them to what has been described as “abuse 
and fraudulent and corrupt practices” (Fatai, 2005, p.iv).  As conveyed by Brown (2013, p.205) 
the “financial accounting shortfall resulted in corruption, fraud, inefficiencies, theft and waste”. 
The Parliament Committee Secretariate (2015, p.12) also echoes similar concerns over the 
“widespread lack of compliance with statutory requirements by the national government 
ministries and agencies, provincial governments, and the capital’s city council”.  The Committee 
has also registered the frustrations of the OAGSI to be able to see systemic failures of 
government accounting breakdowns in all levels of the government.  Sawaneh and Puri (2014) 
identify 663 audit issues found in the provincial financial statements, since 2008, with some 
accounting disclosure issues appearing more than 40 times in the period.  The national 
government accounts also face a similar or worse situation, which OAGSI revealed in the 2013 
annual reports (Cohen, 2014). Some attributed the situation to a lack of training conducted in 
provincial government, for example (Sawaneh and Puri, 2014).  However, Hardman (1984) 
highlighted the shortages of both the practitioners’ added value, and the accounting savvy of 
provincial treasurers, in the financial preparations in the broader SIPS. 
 
 
2.1. Accounting Disclosure Requirements - SIPS Reporting Framework within the Laws 
 
The SIPS FSs are prepared using the Public Financial and Audit Act (1978 PFAA-now repealed) 
and the recent enactment of the 2013 Public Financial Management Act (PFMA). The PFMA 
repealed the entire 1978 PFAA except for the powers of the OAGSI to conduct audits on SIPS 
FSs.  The repealed 1978 PFAA on the other hand is silenced in stating the accounting framework 
requirement to prepare the national accounts.  Section 38 of the repealed Act requires FSs such 
as assets and liabilities, receipts and payments, comparative figures, and other statements to be 
submitted for statutory audits (National Parliament of the Solomon Islands, 1996). Furthermore, 
Section 77 of the PFMA requires that the Accountant General should submit to the Minister 
responsible and the OAGSI of the Government’s balance sheet the assets and liabilities, 
statements of sources of funds, revenues and expenditures and other various governance 
statements (Solomon Islands Government, 2013). In mid-2003, the country’s annual national 
accounts were only submitted to the National Parliament since 1989 (RAMSI, 2013), and 
currently national annual accounts were presented at least up to 2013 financial year, as at 2015 
year end (Cohen, 2015). Comparatively, Section 41 of the 1997 Provincial Government Act 
(PGA) requires that Provincial Executives prepare financial accounts of sums paid and received, 
and a balance sheet of assets and liabilities among other statements (National Parliament of the 
Solomon Islands, 1997).  Clearly, both the PFMA and the PGA require balance sheet items to be 
disclosed and reported. Despite the requirements of the PGA, for example, provincial 
governments revealed that 135 FSs were not prepared by the provincial governments for auditing 
from the years 1993 to 2008 (Sawaneh and Puri, 2014).   
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In 2010 and 2014, the provincial and national governments adopted the IPSAS1 Cash-Basis 
accounting framework, respectively (Sawaneh and Puri, 2014). Global public-sector reform 
institutions support IPSAS as a driving force to address systemic corruption and the wastage of 
public resources in the developing countries (Sanderson and Van Schaik, 2008).  They also 
warned that developing countries will face the high costs of awareness, and the training of 
accountants to operate the IPSAS framework.  With the exceptions of the statement of receipts 
and payments and cash-flows, the statement of assets and liabilities is not to be disclosed as 
primary FSs elements.  The former statements are treated as a mandatory requirement (Schaik, 
2014).  However, the onus to ensure that IPSAS complies with a fair presentation of the FSs lies 
with the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI)2.  Schaik (2014) further points out that the audit, on 
any government consolidated accounts, poses a further issue where other government reporting 
entities comply with other frameworks, such as the International Financial Reporting Standard 
and intra-transactions keeping. Sawaneh and Puri (2014) further highlighted that between 2010 
and 2013 a total of 20 accounting trainings have been conducted including IPSAS. This 
composed of 45 accountants attending 11 accounting trainings and 9 trainings on the accounting 
information systems, which were attended by 27 professional staff. 
 
 
2.2 The authorised auditor 
 
Section 108 of the Solomon Islands Constitution provides for the establishment of the 
constitutional position of an Auditor-General (Solomon Islands Government, 1978). The Office 
of Auditor General in the Solomon Islands is empowered to audit the public offices, ministries, 
courts, authorities, town council, provincial governments among others.  The office was staffed 
with twenty-seven audit staff at the time of the British exit (Clarke, 1985), but in the late 1970s it 
changed to virtually no Auditor-General with only a senior staff member and a cleaner in mid-
2001 (TRC, 2013).  However, a regional intervention led by Australia and New Zealand in mid-
2003 restored many other internal institutions, including the OAGSI, to more than 30 auditors as 
of 2008 (RAMSI, 2013). Given the absence of auditing standards in the Solomon Islands, OAG 
chooses to comply with the International Auditing Standards (ISA)3 to audit its government 
clients.  While his work is not to detect fraud, or is not a bloodhound (Rodda and Cosserat, 
2009), ISA, however, demands an auditor to state where fraud possibilities exist under ISA 240 
(IFAC, 2009).  The ISA 240 enforces that an auditor’s primary auditing goal is not to look for 
fraud, but to give assurance of the financial accounts (IFAC, 2009).  However, the demise of the 
auditing firm Andersen in mid-2000’s enforces the fact that auditors are blameworthy for their 
negligence in not detecting frauds (Lohse, 2002).  OAGSI audit efforts over the years can be 
connected to Tomasic's (1992, p.201) view where “sometimes governments are slow to respond 
to realities of corporate frauds and have preferred not to intervene even when problem matters 
are the subject of detailed official investigations”, in which governments have not been very 
supportive of the auditors’ findings.  
 
                     
1 Subsequent use of the IPSAS term in this study refers to the IPSAS cash-basis framework unless otherwise stated. 
2 This is the institution that governs global Auditor-General Offices. 
3 ISAs are issued by the International Federation of Accountants Board. See: 
http://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/downloads/a012-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-240.pdf 
Page 7 of 24 
2.3 Disclaimer Audit Opinions –DAOs 
The audit opinions of the SIPS FSs are issued by the OAGSI when conducting the assurance 
services (even if the accounts are outsourced for auditing).  With the lack of there being in the 
Solomon Islands  both accounting and auditing framework standards (Hauriasi and Davey, 
2009), the OAGSI is guided by the ISA to perform its functions. An unmodified audit opinion 
implies that a FS being audited complies to an applicable accounting framework in all material 
respects (International Federation of Accountants, 2009). Whereas a modified audit opinion is 
“based on the evidence obtained, [and] the financial statements as a whole are not free from 
material misstatements” (IAAS Board, 2016, para.17). This extends to the inability to obtain 
supporting audit evidence. Further, a  modified audit opinion can be issued as qualified, adverse 
or as a Disclaimer  of Audit Opinions - DAOs (IAAS Board, 2016).  These opinions inferred that 
audit issues were found, and therefore some limitations were imposed on the opinions with 
explanations that users or readers can rely on them with caution. The DAOs are generally not 
found to be uncommon in corporate practices (Tahinakis and Samarinas, 2016).  However, they 
are practically common in the SIPS financial accounts over the last 20 years. and are also found 
in neighbouring Vanuatu for the 2005 -2009 audited financial accounts (Path, 2012). Such audit 
opinions contain the most severe audit issues, if not the worse form of any audit opinion, which 
forbids any reliance on the financial accounts being audited for decision making. Davis (2004) 
clarifies that entities with such opinions such as DAOs signified issues of going concerns, 
funding applications issues, and regarded them as not useful, and there is the inability of reliable 
data to back up the numbers.  For companies that are listed on stock markets in developed 
countries, DAO, whilst rare,  has multiple effects including the plummeting of share prices 
(Frishkoff and Rogowski, 1986),  adverse economic reactions (Hajihosseini et al., 2015) or they 
have reflected lower management integrity, earning manipulations and weak governance 
structure (Chen et al., 2013). Conversely, Barberis et al. (2000) found that auditors do issue 
judgemental errors when issuing final audit reports.  Davis (2004) on the other hand, argued that 
there were instances of auditors issuing opinions with a lack of independence, going concern 
doubts, scope limitation, and significant uncertainties. 
  
 
2.4 Theoretical Development 
 
This study is underpinned by Cressey’s (1973) fraud triangle theory. In the study entitled “Other 
People’s Money”, Cressy interviewed convicted corporate embezzlers and summarised the 
embezzlers’ hypothesis as: “trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of 
themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware this problem can be 
secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own 
conduct in that situation verbalisations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of 
themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds 
or property” (Cressey, 1973, p.30). Overtime, the Cressey’s theory developed to what is now 





2.4.1. Perceived Pressure 
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Cressey (1973, p.34) ‘considers that a financial problem which confronted him [fraudsters] could 
not be shared with persons who, from a more objective point of view, probably could have aided 
in the solution of the problem’. The non-shareable problem refers to financial issues brought 
about by the activities of say gambling or an excessive lifestyle.  Cressey believed that trust 
violators driven by those social problems can turn to employer’s cash or assets to ease their 
problems, or they go on to claim unfairness from their employment treatment or working 
conditions to support their violations.  Perceived pressure is more noticeable than the other two 
components despite the opportunity component,  more commonly found in corporate culture, as 




2.4.2. Perceived Opportunity 
The ‘perceived opportunity’ is referred to as an employee’s action to commit fraud, as a result of 
non-shareable problems.  According to Cressey (1973), it takes an employee  two ways to 
commit fraud through the general information and technical skills learnt from the organisation. 
These refer to accountants using their position to alter things like invoices or manipulate 
financial statements, or a banker manipulating deposits from customers, etc. (Cressey, 1973).  
Albrecht and Albrecht (2003) in Hogan et al. (2008) indicated that a fraud opportunist utilises 
control weaknesses and accounting anomalies, while Albrecht and Romney (1986) in Hogan et 
al. (2008) later opposed it as not being the underlying case.  Opportunists often join employment 
to commit fraud with the knowledge gained from organisational resources like computer systems 
(Lokanan, 2015).  Everett et al., (2007) attribute it to the ineffective practice of accounting 
applications, giving the right ingredients for  opportunists, while Lorde et al. (2016) strongly 
argues that frauds committed under this category were made possible by persons with economic 
hardships or personally advantageous positions. 
 
2.4.3. Rationalisation 
Cressey (1973, p.94) argues in this final component that “rationalization is not an ex post factor 
means of justifying a theft that has already occurred…rather …a component of the crime before 
it takes place; in fact, it is a part of the motivation for the crime”. Offenders or criminals 
commonly realised that their morals have been breached in the initial fraud commitment then 
become normalised through repeated frequency resulting in the subsequent inability to repay. 
Dellaportas (2013, p.32) advocates rationalisation as “the lack of feelings and indifference 
expressed by offenders to justify any guilt arising from their misconduct”, as most occupational 
or organisational frauds incidences are viewed as acceptable by those committing them.  Murphy 
and Dacin (2011) regards this attitude as a “relative mystery”, while IFAC (2009, p.167) sees 
rationalisation as either committed employees being put under pressure, or are voluntarily set to 
commit fraud. Further, Roden et al. (2016) refers to managers’ unrealistic financial forecasts as 
fraud by accounting principles or accounting estimates determinations.  Rationalised frauds are 
often blamed for the lack of financial knowledge in board membership (Skousen and Wright, 
(2008) in Roden, Cox and Kim, (2016)). Others commit frauds and rationalise them by the 
neutralisation attitude to shield off such guilts (Stout (2007) in Lokanan, (2015)). Murphy and 
Dacin (2011) attribute the lack of fraud awareness and economic gains as reasons to commit 
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fraud, while some corporate executives have seen criminal acts as being a necessary part of their 
corporate job (Ball, 2009).  
 
 
Yekini et al. (2018) provided evidence of organisational factors having significant influence on 
occupational fraud. Brytting et al. (2011, p.57) find attributed justifications as “everyone is doing 
it and it is for a good cause”, while Albrecht et al. (2004, p.118) concurred in capital market 
settings that corporate executives’ desire to do it to keep the stock price high.  Murphy and Free 
(2015) seemed to suggest that an individual’s attitude or set of ethical behaviours allow one’s 
intention to commit dishonest fraud acts. In some circumstances, fraudsters initially committed 
fraud under a clean sheet, having no initial fraud record. They would also attempt to justify their 
actions, for example, being due to poor remunerations or poor working conditions or the inability 
to look after their general welfare (Yekini et al., 2018; Ohalehi, 2018).  Cressey (1973) on the 
other hand, considered trust violators as being independent businessmen, long term violators and 
absconders with their own rationalisations.  It must also be noted that Cressey (1973, p.102) 
defines “long-term violators as individuals who converted their employer’s funds, or funds 
belonging to their employer’s clients, by taking relatively small amounts over a period of time”. 
Their rationalisation was to avoid their families being hungry or getting poor. The second view 
by  Cressey (1973) under this component was that fraudsters’ actions are necessary because the 
employer is not treating them well, for example, good working remunerations, and so resort to 




2.5 Criticisms and further developments to the Fraud Triangle 
 
Several scholars introduced new insights to the Fraud Triangle over the years. For instance, 
Albrecht, Howe and Romney (1984) introduced situational pressures, perceived pressures and 
personal integrity with fraud scale findings. Hollinger and Clark, (1983) further aimed at 
discussing quantified fraud costs, work place conditions, and highlighted the latter as a key 
motivator for the frauds committed. In addition, Dorminey et al. (2012) argue that not all frauds 
were non-shareable, as perceived by Cressey, and introduced a new idea known as the money, 
ideology, coercion and ego/entitlement (MICE). They believe MICE is well placed with the 
global corporate events in the post 2000 corporate scandals. The diamond concept introduces the 
term ‘capability’ as the fourth component of the fraud triangle, which is attributed to the 
employee’s usage of their employees’ technical know-how to commit fraud (Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004). Ramamoorti (2008) publicises the ABC method with the view that advocates 
that fraud is being committed by bad apples (A) for which these bad ‘As’ consider collusion 
through the bad bushel (B), while ‘C’ implies a bad crop referring to fraud influence as being 
predominantly committed by a community culture. The former, despite its attempt to add 
‘compatibility’, is not really adding to Cressey’s fraud hypothesis theory.   
 
 
Free et al. (2007), on the other hand, contextualise the fraud triangle onto an organisational 
setting to include charismatic leadership, subverted management controls and permissive culture 
as their new insights. Other researchers, however, link corporate events to the fraud triangle. 
Roden et al. (2016), for example, link the fraud triangle and the corporate frauds of the US 
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Securities Economic Commission to chief executive officers and the chairperson scandals, and 
refers to share options benefits as being tied to executive remunerations. Murphy and Free 
(2015) choose incidences of ‘instrumental organisational climate ‘and employees’ attitude to 
commit fraud. They find rationalisation more prevalent than others in the fraud triangle. As a 
result, fraudsters also justified that it was situations labelled as a ‘special crisis’ that lured them 
to commit fraud. Dellaportas (2013) finds professionals who deceive victims influenced by the 
‘special crises’ they are faced with but suggests further that proactive means such as training can 
be implemented to prevent fraud incidences. Dorminey et al. (2012) on the other hand, consider 
the fraud triangle as a model for the risk assessing of fraud risks and claimed it as just being part 




3. Research Method 
The study adopts a qualitative approach. Primary data were collected using semi-structured 
interviews. Other sources of evidence, which include amongst others, the historical audited 
reports issued for the public sector Financial Statements (FSs), audit executive responses and 
management representation letters, base-line studies on the public sector, related media release 
and others were used to validate the findings. These were integrated with the discussions. Using 
the possible linkages between fraud, FSF, FTF and the DAOs, the study seeks to address the 
following research interview questions below, to obtain a better understanding of practitioners’ 
views and the perception on FSF, within the SIPS context.  
 
1. What type of fraud do practitioners (auditor or accountants) meet in their professional 
career? 
2. How do existing frameworks (accounting standards, relevant laws) play a significant role 
in the fraud process?  
3. What are examples of FSF and FTF that are found in the recurrent audit issues in the 
repeated DAOs? and  
4. What has been done to reduce DAOs within SIPS and the practical trends, if any? 
 
 
A non-probability sampling was used to select research participants through 10 recorded 
interviews that were conducted to identify the research’s core themes which were developed 
from the data. An initial 33 interview requests were made, and 13 participants accepted to be 
interviewed; however, only 10 interviews were successfully carried out. These interviews lasted 
on average 60 minutes. It is acknowledged that the size of sample is not very large, but the fact 
that Solomon Island is a relatively small nation with an expected population of 680,806 in 2019 
(Solomon Islands National statistics office, 2018). This explains the limited nature of the 
research sample size. The questions asked on DAOs were linked to the interviewees’ 
professional practices of financial statements preparations, audited results and fraud literature. 
We investigated the links between fraud and the recurring audit issues in the Disclaimer Audit 
Opinions (DAOs) reports within the Solomon Islands Public Sector (SIPS). Utilising the case-
study methodology, we intend to bring the expressed perceptions of the SIPS’s practitioners to 
see what can be done differently, that might reduce the disclaimer audit opinions apart from the 
processes implemented over the years to improve the audit opinions within SIPS. The 
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interviewees’ responses were analysed and linked with the existing literature. The research 
participants are professional practitioners and mostly SIPS accountants (one participant), 
advisors and auditors (nine participants) with professional experiences ranging from 5 to 20 
years. They have a detailed knowledge of the study’s interview questions, and seeking their 
professional views provides the study with a contemporary understanding of the participants and 
their depth of knowledge. These professional practitioners have prepared and/or audited the 
public sector FSs within SIPS.  
 
 
3.1 Research themes 
Four significant themes were developed from the data. The themes thus are presented and 
summarised as: 
 
• Facing fraud as SIPS practitioners; 
• Fraud viewed within the expected legal and accounting reporting frameworks; 
• Fraud is viewed within the ‘repeated’ DAOs; and  
• Fraud is viewed by looking up to the Executive Management/Authority. 
 
 
3.1.1 Facing Fraud as SIPS Practitioner 
The outcome of the interviews revealed that participants agreed that fraud, in the form of FS, FT 
or other forms of financial frauds, has been identified in their professional career.  Practitioners 
generally accept that fraud is identified when terms such as omission, deception or being misled 
are the cause of an event which provides an advantage/benefit to someone.  Secondly, as 
practitioners, finding or detecting fraud is not part of their job when executing their statutory 
audit plan, as it is not their job. “Basically, auditors do not look for fraud when carrying out audit 
work but to assert that the accounts are true and fair, while on other hand, fraud is something that 
is intentionally done” (SIG10, 1). While (SIG5, 1) shares the experience of seeing some 
components of the FSs as being omitted from the FSs disclosures, and attributes these omissions 
as fraud during audit field work executions.  Another interviewee expresses the following: “In an 
accounting transaction, fraud is stealing or seemingly conducting abnormally the organisational 
rules, regulations and so on. For example, if a transaction falls outside of these rules and 
regulations, this therefore is deemed as committing fraud” (SIG8, 1). In addition, (SIG5, 1) 
enforces the practice that departments4 should be given enough opportunity to respond to audit 
issues to reduce fraud prior to finalising a management representation letter5. When a client has 
had an insufficient response time to their management representation letters, fraud can be blindly 
assumed. 
 
Some instances, however, pointed to fraud as being enhanced by political interferences that 
contributed to the outcome of SIPS FSs or FTs fraud incidences. “Revenue collection was 
                     
4 Department is used interchangeably to imply government ministry or provincial government. 
5 In auditing standard, it refers to the letter that contains the issues found during the audit. 
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carried out by both the department senior officers and the elective executives including the 
political head.  These officers and political representatives held on to department’s receipt books, 
were issuing income receipts and personally spent the department’s revenues obtained from the 
corporate business licenses including logging companies” (SIG6, 1). Practitioners also identify 
frauds through what they find in the FS disclosures and other processes, or from accounting 
standards underpinning the FS disclosure. Similarly, there are fraud indicators that can be 
identified with the implementation of audits or identifying them within a FS itself. As one 
response put it: “A problematic accounts source is a nursery ground for fraud. This is also 




3.1.2 Frauds view within the expected legal and accounting frameworks 
The feedback sought from the interviewees revealed significant support for the legal 
requirements, such as the PFMA and the PGA with their supported financial instructions (FIs) or 
financial management ordinances (FMOs) as not contributing to fraud conduct.  The law requires 
the disclosure of the profit and loss and balance sheet items as requirements. The IPSAS Cash-
basis accounting framework, however, is supported the same as assisting the possibility of fraud 
conduct in both FS and FT frauds. “The varying disclosure requirement basis between the IPSAS 
and the FMO has promoted fraud.  The former, which is the professional framework, does not 
support full disclosure of financial statement transactions.  This framework allows frauds to be 
hidden, as it is easy to hide fraud in the financial statements, which include the balance sheet 
items, considered as an optional disclosure” (SIG1, 3). While another interviewee put it as: 
“Based on the definition of fraud and the requirement of the IPSAS Cash-basis, the omission, or 
the optional disclosures of some of the balance sheet items, fall onto the fraud definition because 
users of the financial statements have been deceived or something has been omitted. The FMO 
on the other hand, requires the disclosure of everything and if this legal framework was not 
adhered to, fraud had occurred regardless, as some information has not been disclosed” (SIG2, 
3). The PGA and PFMA require both the FMO and the FIs, respectively. These laws require that 
the balance sheet items be disclosed and produced in separate FSs. With IPSAS, it requires the 
optional disclosures of all balance sheet items as ‘encouraged disclosures’; the interviewees, 
after years of professional conducts and experience, revealed the following: “The 2013 PFMA, 
in fact, requires the compulsory disclosure of the balance sheet items which conflicts with the 
professional accounting standard, IPSAS, and hence the SIPS should have used the IPSAS 
accrual-basis other than the IPSAS cash-basis.  It is now time that the public-sector authorities 
should find ways to agree to introduce the IPSAS accrual-basis to match the gaps between the 
law and the accounting framework.  As practitioners, the gap seemed to be fraud by its 
definition.  When the law requires the balance sheet to be disclosed, it basically referred to 
accrual accounting” (SIG5, 3). 
 
The reporting gaps between these two requirements are noteworthy and obvious as being 
negatively impacted by the genuine intentions of the accounting standard setters and legislators.  
An interviewee chooses to divert the negative issues to the wider SIPS executive management as 
another set of contributory factors to the current reporting fiasco. “Because of the lack of 
monitoring, the executive management seemed to play around with the asset 
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acquisition/recording and financial statement disclosure, and because of the understanding about 
optional disclosure, executive management can take advantage with the lack of enforceability to 
abuse assets acquisition as an example. Auditors conduct, on the other hand, provides checks to 
ensure that asset transactions and physical presence are verified for record completeness to 
reduce fraud, even if some standards require an accounts optional disclosure.  The presence of 
fraud cannot be nullified because they are not monitored; fraud seemed to take precedence when 




3.1.3. Fraud is viewed within the ‘reappearance’ to disclaimer audit opinions issues 
 
The DAOs, as discussed in the literature review, signify its severity and its rarity in practice.  
This specific theme is interesting to the study as the DAOs both reoccurred over the years in the 
SIPS and serves as an extreme in the auditing profession.  Given the continuity of this 
magnitude, this study sees it as an additional test of any possible nexus between the trend and the 
re-occurrence of the DAOs and their supporting contents. 
 
Interviewees agree that fraud is certain when the audit issues or internal control issues impacting 
DAOs have abnormally appeared annually based on the SIPS financial statement audit reports. 
Others seem to suggest some specific issues, such as a lack of internal control monitoring, or that 
executive management has done little to remedy the DAOs issues. “The audit recommendations 
are dealt within executive managements who also have no clue on accounting knowledge, and 
therefore will not understand whether the issues have been addressed or not.  So, when audit 
issues reoccurred annually it implies that frauds have also reoccurred” (SIG3, 4). One other 
practitioner divulges feedback by expressing a similar view. “Not every issue is fraud.  However, 
most issues reflect management failures; they promised to resolve them through executive 
responses but had not implemented them…but other issues yes, and they are fraud.  For example, 
procurement operational issues which were failed by the management, as these issues reoccurred 
as audit issues in the procurement issues” (SIG10, 4). Several interviewees provided varying but 
diverse responses, such as the fixed assets register, for example, reappeared as audit issues 
annually being a non-response to record keeping or the updating of assets (SIG4, 4). On the other 
hand, some suggestions seem to point to their being little attention given to internal controls by 
the management: “The frequency of the audit issues that re-appeared over the years seemed to 
indicate the likelihood of fraud having occurred and reoccurred. This fraud likelihood extends to 
the fact that weak internal controls, having been prevalent, are resulting in the re-appearance of 
the audit issues over the interested period.  On the other hand, the management (executive 




3.1.4 Fraud is viewed by looking up to the Executive Management or Authority 
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This final theme follows the final RQ to redirect away from the norm as required by the auditing 
standards. The norm requires auditors to issue their annual audit issue findings to the 
management or the department executive management in the form of a management 
representation letter. The executive normally responds to the auditors with remedial plans to 
counter the ways to resolve the issues by outlining the steps suggested to resolve the audit issues.  
The study interviewees, however, given years of auditing and accounting experience provide 
insights on what could be done given the current trend of the reappearance of the SIPS audit 
issues. Two responses have suggested that prompt fraud investigations need to be carried out. 
“Firstly, the internal audit Department of the government needs to be active and strengthened by 
conducting spot checks on monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly government operations. The internal 
audit can pick up issues or detect issues at this level.  Secondly, there are suspicious issues 
documented on the outcome of the OAGSI’s work and a fraud investigation needs to be called up 
to do the investigation and using existing law to conduct a full investigation on the concerned 
department” (SIG8, 5). But training seemed to focus towards accountants who have either no 
technical knowledge or no interest to implement the earned knowledge from this training.  This 
is seen as the reason for failing to implement the remedial plans. “The problem with so many 
trainings conducted on the public-sector accountants is that they have been done to officers who 
have no idea about accounting, as accounting is a technical area on its own” (SIG5, 5).  
 
Management on the other hand should not isolate themselves with the audit issues reported.  
They should be key players around the non-implementation of their own agreed executive 
remedial plans to the audit issues, or it could represent their management incompetency. 
“Something is wrong with the executive management that is looking after the executive 
responses and the operations of the government or the organisation. When the executive 
responses remain outstanding for years, we may like to consider the incompetency of the senior 
officers who are placed to look after the departments” (SIG1, 5). A suggested area of 
investigation and issuing penalties for non-performing accountants are conveyed by some 
interviewees. This ensures creating a responsive practitioner who can be kept alert to 
departmental non-compliances or their own audit remedial plans. “If the audit issues re-appeared 
annually as they are now, some penalties need to be implemented on the accountants because a 
law was breached.  What is left for us to do is to act on the law by disciplining the accountants’ 
concerns.  In a way, the relevant authorities have not implemented laws when they are breached 
by exercising their powers” (SIG3, 5). One interviewee chooses to relate the fraud conduct to the 
executive management, being accountable officers and stewards of departmental operations. 
“The auditors should establish a mechanism to communicate with the public-sector accountants 
to help reduce the audit issues, as well as recommending the removal of accountants through the 
accountable officers in the public sector.  When accountable officers, such as provincial or 
permanent secretaries, are not exercising the removal of officers they are concerned with, it 
seems that they are entertaining fraud conduct, as the audit results are reflected in the technical 
limitation of the staff” (SIG5, 5). 
 
3.2 Practitioners’ Exposed to Fraud  
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As mentioned in the literature review, fraud definition and its elements offer the audit results of 
the FSs as being misleading to users, or decision makers, as a result of both intentional actions or 
inactions to gain an advantage from the accounting reporting (Hopwood et al., 2012). This 
advantage has benefited fraudsters, as some relevant FSs information has been omitted during 
annual FS preparations. The position of the practitioners is that they concurred with the fraud 
definition, and an equivalent percentage explains how FS and FT frauds can be easily identified. 
This is particularly in the views of interviewees, as reflected by the 100% rating, given their 
enough practising experiences in accounting and auditing, of which some have more than twenty 




90% of respondents provide fraud examples, such as government revenue balances that have not 
been fully disclosed in the accounts, accounts receivable balances that have either been 
undisclosed or unaccounted for, and the abuse of the accounting system and the 
maladministration of internal controls, etc. These responses have not been isolated and are anew.  
Researchers who documented the early 2000 corporate collapses (Benston and Hartgraves, 
2002), and the post 2008 global financial crises (Hogan et al., 2008), have identified a similar 
pattern of ‘cooked’ accounting incidences in the Enron and Lehman Brothers collapses, 
respectively. In view of these, it can be easily agreed that there is a trend of ‘other processes as 
contributing to fraud’ by 60% of responses.  This implies the SIPS accountants’ or management 
executives’ silence or inactions over auditors’ recommendations. 
 
 
The ‘hard to identify fraud incidences’ by 30% explains the practitioners in the auditing 
perspective, which audits only on executing an audit plan and programs.  They only raise the 
circumstances where they think frauds have occurred or which are frauds possibilities (IFAC, 
2009) despite the re-enforcement of lawsuit cases for auditors, such as the recent demised 
Andersen Firm failing to detect fraud (Lohse, 2002).  The 20% rating identifies fraud 
contributory factors through politicians’ interferences in the SIPS. This response comes about 
when the interviewees attempt to explain and justify the actual fraud incidences within the SIPS.  
This, however, supports the view by Tomasic (1992) where corporate frauds have been long 
neglected by governments, and is also relevant to the Solomon Islands’ jailing of a Member of 
Parliament in 2013 and the suspension from duties of two6 senior officers in the Ministry of 
Police, National Security and Correctional Services as examples of SIPS frauds (RNZ, 2013; PIR 
Editor, 2016).  This is also consistent with Cressey’s fraud triangle where positions of trust 
through employment have been violated by those occupying them. 
 
 
3.3 Accounting Framework as Catalyst to Committing Fraud 
 
The disclosure requirements expected from the law (PGA and PFMA), and the compliance to 
IPSAS as a professional reporting framework, identify the disclosure mismatch which is 
supported by the interviewees’ responses. Whilst it may be agreed due to the varying degrees 
                     
6 The Financial Controller and the Permanent Secretary 
Page 16 of 24 
around the two mismatches and disclosure misconceptions, it must also be further noted that FS 
and FT frauds can also be made possible through the unreconciled accounting gaps. 
 
 
Schaik (2014) acknowledges the IPSAS disclosures reporting gaps, while this study confirms 
90% of the practitioners who identify the disclosure reporting gap as a possible fraud contributor.  
The practitioners’ perceptions are consistent with the general fraud concept definitions (Pickett, 
2011) that the non-mandatory disclosure of the IPSAS framework (Schaik, 2014) provides FS 
elements to be omitted, and hence has deceived FS users.  This also supports the viewpoint of 
Everett et al., (2007)  where opportunists capitalise on an ineffective accounting practice to 
commit fraud.  
 
 
The other two rankings, however, (Encouraged: Omission is fraud and IPSAS as non-compliance 
to laws) of 60% and 70% respectively, follow the general justification of IPSAS as fraud stimuli.  
Whilst it does not specifically refer to the IPSAS’s intention  to encourage fraud per se,  it is seen 
in the context of financial accounting reporting as infrequent or as none at all for some ministries 
of the SIPS (Clark and Levy, 2012b). 
 
 
There is also a need to enforce IPSAS trainings, as the SIPS accountants have limited knowledge 
on reporting the financial statements prepared under IPSAS, as indicated by 30% of respondents. 
This on the other hand, does not reflect the numerous trainings implemented nationally (Sawaneh 
and Puri, 2014) and regionally by the regional learning institutions on IPSAS (PASAI, 2016). 
Nevertheless, this confirms  the anticipated World Bank IPSAS training issues across the globe, 
such as training affordability issues (Sanderson and Van Schaik, 2008).  One extreme response 
from participants is to design customised training for both auditors and accountants so that the 
expected ways and means to close audit issues can be consensually agreed together.  However, 
the last 10% signifies the practitioners’ response as not experiencing any fraud at least in the 
current running audits. 
 
 
3.4 Identifying fraud within Practitioners’ engagements 
 
The SIPS annual FSs have their audit reports, since the 1980s, issued with DAOs.  These audited 
issues repeatedly occurred annually and continued to do so up to the 2014 SIPS reports and are 
now unbecoming from a professional perspective. The practitioners agreed that FS and FT frauds 
occurred as represented by the higher responses of 90% and 100%, respectively.  Interviewees 
provide examples such as the non-disclosure or incomplete disclosures of FT or FS items such as 
revenue, accounts receivables, non-current assets or missing documents as inevitably impacting 
the DAOs trend.  They accepted the trend as significantly impacting the completeness of the 
SIPS annual financial statements reports, which confirms the fraud triangle’s ‘perceived 
opportunity’ where FS manipulations were committed through official occupied positions. 
 
 
The enormous agreement to the trend is the identification of fraud examples as being either FS 
fraud or FT fraud, which potentially align to respective concepts in the literature.  Hopwood et 
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al., (2012) generalise the fraudulent reporting schemes as inclusive of improper revenue 
recognition, account misappropriation or as an under or overstatatement of FSs.  The previous 
OAGSI in his annual SIPS report highlighted the fraud risks trends (Cohen, 2014), and is also 
supported by the current OAGSI where non-current assets remained as still unaddressed to date 
(Lokay, 2017).   
 
 
A further significant portion,  90%, suggests that the trend of re-appearance of the audit issues as 
not being caught out by fraud, but rather by the attitude and work ethics of the management  to 
comply to organisational procedures, and also to closing their agreed remedial audit strategic 
plans over the years. Their compliance to organisational job descriptions should have been 
questioned on the basis of this trend.  This relates to Dellaportas' (2013) idea that fraud is 
committed from a lack of feelings to their society, as a result of their continous guilt and 
misconduct, and is also described as a relative mystery by (Murphy and Free, 2015).  And this 
further supports the occupational fraud terminology as advocated by (Ratley, 2016). The 20% 
figure represented by ‘Neutral’ implies the perception that they are not confident to reveal if the 
re-appearance of the same audit issues are frauds. Whilst there is a suspicion of fraud within the 
audit reports, the responses signify their role as not being one to detect frauds.  This can be 
linked to where auditors have a fixed audit time frame to conduct their audit, and also the 
wordings such as missing documents, lack of supporting documents and missing  executive 
minutes at auditees, which are typical and ongoing (Cohen, 2014; Sawaneh and Puri, 2014).  
 
3.5 Summary to Fraud Perspectives  
The study finds that fraud and its associated concepts such as FS and FTs frauds are 
acknowledged and can be easily identified.  This identification applies to both FS preparations 
and the auditing of the same during practitioners’ professional engagements.  There are also the 
practitioners’ general concurrences of fraud conducts  bringing benefits to fraudsters or managers 
and hence their conduct (Hopwood et al., 2012). 
 
While this present study confirms the literature, the study also contributes additional evidence 
that suggests further that when a public sector remains adamant to remedy compliance issues, 
and there is silence about audit recommendations, this illustrates attributes of fraud.  This 
suggests, as among others, that there is ‘political interference’ in the SIPS operations or basically 
there is fraud in it’s entirely. It is important to add that this applies to contexts like the study’s 
context. 
3.6 Summary of the Accounting Disclosure Requirements  
Further to RIQ1, this study confirms  the findings of Schaik (2014) around IPSAS disclosure 
gaps, which significantly stimulate fraud in the SIPS relating to its non-mandatory disclosure of 
assets and liabilities as optional disclosure.  The omission of such items had brought FSs into to 
disrepute, as deceptive to FS users and decision makers (Pickett, 2011).  Furthermore, it confirms 
a ‘perceived opportunity’ under the fraud triangle, as SIPS accountants did nothing to stop fraud 
incidences using their occupied positions. However, there are the correlating practitioners’ 
responses that suggest that compliance to PGA and PFMA could minimise the fraud incidences 
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given the mandatory compliances to disclose assets and liabilities. Therefore, these legal 
expectations can bring fraud conducts to a minimal.   
 
3.7 Summary of the Disclaimer Audit opinions (DAOs)  
The RIQ3 responses have demonstrated for the first time that DAOs can be seen negatively when 
it is both issued by auditors and that, its issuance continues for a repeated period of time.  This 
study confirms as financial fraud and its related concepts when the same or similar audit issues 
appear unresolved and reappear repeatedly over a period without any attempts to remedy them or 
attend to them.  However, it becomes a norm given their repeated appearances, and can be 
aligned to the ‘rationalisation’ component where fraudsters rationalise their actions as not being 
identified as fraud given the audit issues’ frequency in this case. Furthermore, there are also 
additional insights to this study where management incompetence takes precedence over fraud.  
While these findings are conclusive in nature to the SIPS experiences, the literature reinforces 
that managers, who have no care for, or feelings about,  society, continue to commit fraud and 
misconduct, see Dellaportas (2013). 
 
 
3.8 Summary on the linkages between Fraud and DAOs  
On the question of linkages between Fraud and DAOs, we find an overwhelming confirmation in 
the synergy between the two.  According to the practitioners’ judgments, the former conforms to 
its concepts if the latter carries audit issues that have either been neglected or have never been 
attended to.  With such reoccurrences, and using SIPS governance performance and indicators, 
there is a positive linkage between the management executives who were unable to close their 
audit issues who probably have fears to address the DAO issues as a result of the political 
directions, or those who have committed their common fraud either by mutual or independent 
collaboration. This study has demonstrated, for the first time, that where the SIPS practitioners 
exercise conservatism in the direct use of the term fraud, in subsequent audit reports issued, is 
when DAOs have repeated audited issues. This professional conservatism agrees to ISA rules, 
but it has, however, sealed the truth of the SIPS fraud reporting to the FS users, decision-makers 




4. Conclusion and recommendation 
This study seeks to extend knowledge on financial frauds by examining practitioners’ 
interpretation of FTs and FSs fraud. Practitioners find that FTs and FSs fraud within the SIPS are 
prevalent. In view of their professional experiences, they find that the intentions of the IPSAS 
accounting framework have been diminished and thereby incentivize fraud conducts. Further 
legal requirements imposed to fully comply with accounting disclosures have been neglected 
which erred and can potentially allow omissions of some balance sheet components such as 
assets and liabilities. While the literature agrees with the practitioners’ views, research interview 
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question three seems to uphold a fresh perception that is not covered in the literature and the 
locality of the study. This is that those equivalent or similar repeated issues, which have been 
repeating over a certain audited period, suggest that fraud is being committed either by 
management or due to collaboration with political interference. This view suggests that it 
correlates positively in jurisdictions with a short supply of accountants, and a country with an 
adverse good governance ranking. 
 
 
The study further suggests robust monitoring, continual training and oversight roles from the 
SIPS ministries and OAGSI to curb the continuity of unresolved issues in management 
representation letters.  Others suggested, that having seen these unresolved issues going on for 
far too long, that they require reactive means such as special criminal investigations. The 
‘perceived opportunity’ and ‘rationalisation’ components of the fraud triangle seem to suggest 
some direct linkages. Taken together, these findings suggest that repeated audited issues over a 
certain period and accompanied with the executive managements’ ignorance to remedy the 
repeated audited issues, promote various forms of financial frauds in the SIPS setting. 
 
This section addresses the concluding question posed to the interviewees in an attempt to find 
ways to resolve the audit issues that are innovatively sound compared to past practices. The 
following are recommended: 
 
The OGASI legislative reform should be brought forward to cater and expand its functions.  This 
is not to change their fraud detection perceptions (Tomasic, 1992) but to empower OGASI from 
its current inability to do and implement its functions effectively (Clarke, 1985; Clark and Levy, 
2012b; Cohen, 2014). 
 
Following on from the regulations, the practitioners recommend that the IPSAS accrual 
accounting framework be made compatible to current existing laws such as PGA and the PFMA.  
Their compliances are reducing these public sector frauds. There is also incompetent 
departmental management, as well as the inability of management who pay no attention to DAOs 
issues, and that they should be given appropriate disciplinary actions using the current PGA and 
PFMA regulations. While staff training, and the reshuffle and recruitment of the SIPS managers 
are vital, this study recommends further that the private sector model of corporate discipline 
should be implemented effectively by responsible authorities/agencies. 
 
The current investigation is limited by some difficulties, such as samples from other sectors of 
the wider SIPS as not being forthcoming; and therefore, offer some limitations to the current 
expressed views. Other than that, despite the good intentions of IPSAS, its intentions are 
irrelevant for jurisdictions that have accountants who pay less attention to accounting procedures 
and accounting standard frameworks. Finally, this study is done in a third world country context 
which has historical issues with governance in the public sector. Future research should attempt 
to include fraud linkages on situations of repeated qualified audit opinions, and also further study 
might provide new insights on how local culture influences fraud incidents in either the private 
or public sectors in the Solomon Islands.  
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